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Probing the limits of Crocean historicism
Charles L. Leavitt IV
Department of Modern Languages and European Studies, University of Reading, UK
ABSTRACT
This article reconsiders the post-war reaction against Benedetto
Croce, focusing on the critical reappraisal of Crocean historicism
that followed the defeat of Italian Fascism. Motivated by a
growing sense of historical uncertainty, Italians increasingly
dissented from Croce, but they remained more wedded to
Crocean thought – and in particular to Crocean historicism – than
has often been argued. Like their predecessors in previous
generations, post-war Italian intellectuals positioned themselves
dialogically, in constant conversation with Croce’s hegemonic
philosophy. The antecedents of their reaction against Crocean
historicism can therefore be identified in earlier responses to
Croce’s thought, and in this essay I examine two such responses:
those of Antonio Gramsci and Renato Serra. I also examine the
contemporary resonances of the (partial) anti-Crocean turn,
exemplified by a consequential 1992 debate over Holocaust
historiography pitting Carlo Ginzburg against Hayden White.
Comparing these various assaults on the ‘Crocean citadel of
historicist idealism’, I argue that the challenge to Croce has been
posed most cogently by those whose dissent from his dominant
intellectual paradigm was inspired not by outright opposition but
rather by doubt and scepticism. In the essay’s conclusion, I
explore the significance of such scepticism, exemplified by the
post-war critique of Crocean historicism, for the ongoing debates
over ‘probing the limits of representation’.
SOMMARIO
In questo saggio prendo in considerazione la reazione contro
Benedetto Croce nel periodo postbellico, concentrandomi sulla
rivalutazione critica dello storicismo crociano dopo la sconfitta del
fascismo italiano. Spinti dall’incertezza storica del dopoguerra, gli
intellettuali italiani in quel periodo dissentirono da Croce, ma
rimasero più condizionati dalla filosofia crociana – e in particolare
dallo storicismo crociano – di quanto è stato riconosciuto dalla
maggior parte della critica. Come i loro predecessori nelle
generazioni precedenti, gli intellettuali del dopoguerra si sono
stabiliti culturalmente in maniera dialogica, e cioè in
conversazione costante con la filosofia egemonica di Croce. Gli
antecedenti della loro reazione allo storicismo crociano, quindi,
possono essere identificati nelle risposte al pensiero di Croce
formulate in generazioni passate, e in questo saggio esamino due
KEYWORDS
Historicism; Benedetto Croce;
Giacomo Debenedetti; Carlo
Ginzburg; Antonio Gramsci;
Hayden White
PAROLE CHIAVE
Storicismo; Benedetto Croce;
Giacomo Debenedetti; Carlo
Ginzburg; Antonio Gramsci;
Hayden White
© 2018 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group
This is an Open Access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original work is properly cited.
CONTACT Charles L. Leavitt IV c.l.leavitt@reading.ac.uk Department of Modern Languages and European Studies,
University of Reading, Whiteknights, PO Box 218, Reading, Berkshire, UK
THE ITALIANIST, 2017
VOL. 37, NO. 3, 387–406
https://doi.org/10.1080/02614340.2017.1409309
risposte esemplificative di questa tendenza: quelle di Antonio
Gramsci e Renato Serra. Inoltre, prendo in considerazione le
risonanze contemporanee della tendenza (parzialmente) anti-
crociana, rintracciabili nell’importante dibattito avvenuto nel 1992
sulla storiografia della Shoah, in cui Carlo Ginzburg critica
fortemente la posizione di Hayden White. Paragonando questi
diversi attacchi alla ‘cittadella crociana dello storicismo idealistico’,
sostengo che la sfida a Croce è stata posta in modo più
convincente non dagli intellettuali spinti da un’opposizione
intellettuale totale, ma invece da quelli motivati da dubbio e da
scetticismo. Nella conclusione del saggio, esamino il significato di
quello scetticismo, esemplificato dalla critica postbellica allo
storicismo crociano, per i dibattiti in corso sulla possibilità di
‘indagare i limiti della rappresentazione’.
‘There is an inexpungeable relativity in every representation of historical phenomena’,
argued Hayden White in his contribution to the influential 1990 conference dedicated
to ‘Probing the Limits of Representation’.1 It was opposition to precisely this sort of
sentiment that had provided the impetus for the conference, whose aim was to
confront White with the potential consequences of his subjectivist approach to
historiography. To many of the conference’s attendees, including its organiser, Saul
Friedländer, White’s approach seemed to suggest one particularly noxious consequence:
they thought it invited and perhaps even legitimated Holocaust denial. Friedländer had
convened the conference, in fact, in order to invite reflections on whether White’s
tropological emphasis on the structure of historical narrative over the substance of
historical fact would undermine the ability, as one critic has put it, ‘to guard the
historical integrity of the Holocaust’s facticity’.2
Among those who sought to reassert that facticity, Carlo Ginzburg took a unique
approach, attempting to historicize White’s position and in this way to reposition the
symposium on the Holocaust’s challenge to postmodernism as a referendum on the
legacy of Italian neo-idealism. White had claimed to echo Benedetto Croce’s 1893 essay
‘La storia ridotta sotto il concetto generale dell’arte’ in arguing that historical ‘events are
real not because they occurred but because, first, they were remembered and, second,
they are capable of finding a place in a chronologically ordered sequence’.3 Seizing on
such statements, Ginzburg sought to destabilize White’s allegedly Crocean position
by invoking the argument of one of Croce’s contemporaries, the literary critic
Renato Serra, and asserting, against White’s ‘inexpungeable relativity’, that ‘reality
[… ] exists’, that there is a ‘cosa in sé’, as Serra had once argued against Croce.4
This was a decidedly counter-intuitive line of attack. Serra’s response to Croce,
which Ginzburg invoked in an attempt to re-assert the Holocaust’s historical
facticity, was in its original context an attempt to convey a sense of historical
uncertainty, to hold up for scrutiny Croce’s confident pronouncements on historical
methodology, and to suggest a certain scepticism regarding the historian’s capacity
to grasp historical reality. Serra expressed doubts about the hegemonic notion of
idealist historicism that Croce had articulated.5 Ginzburg claimed to find in that
expression of doubt the inspiration for a defence of the incontrovertible reality of
history.
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The essay that follows explores the historical foundations and theoretical implications
of this clash between sceptical realism and idealist historicism. Like Ginzburg, I focus on
the challenge to historicism posed by the Second World War and the Holocaust; like
Ginzburg, as well, I emphasize the significance of the Serra–Croce debate. Ginzburg,
however, looked to Serra to counter what he saw as the Crocean foundations of White’s
‘skepticism and relativism’, insisting that, while ‘Serra explicitly rejected simple positivist
attitudes’, nevertheless ‘his remarks help us to reject also a perspective which piles up
positivism and relativism’, such that Ginzburg is led to conclude that ‘an unlimited
skeptical attitude toward historical narrative is [… ] groundless’.6 In contrast, I want to
argue that it was precisely the sceptical attitude adopted by Serra that provided the
most effective opposition to Crocean historicism. Even after the Second World War, as I
will outline below, the challenge to Croce’s hegemony was posed most cogently not by
those who successfully articulated an alternative but rather by those whose uncertainty
and scepticism led them tentatively to dissent from the dominant intellectual paradigm
of the day. My claim is two-fold: historicism provided the ground on which Croce was
challenged; historical uncertainty provided the impetus for that challenge. If the Serra–
Croce debate and the subsequent diminution of Croce’s intellectual influence have
implications for Holocaust historiography, therefore, they may not be entirely aligned
with those suggested by Ginzburg.
‘Un mondo dove niente si perde’: Croce and Serra
Renato Serra’s 1912 letter to Croce, which inspired Carlo Ginzburg’s riposte to Hayden
White, was itself inspired by Croce’s essay ‘Storia, cronaca e false storie’, which had
been published earlier the same year. Attempting to explain his precept that ‘ogni vera
storia è storia contemporanea’, Croce had devoted that essay to an exploration of the
links between historical documents, historical narration, and the historian’s capacity to
relate historical truths.7 He argued that history always had to have a solid empirical
foundation, but could not proceed merely from the sterile accumulation of inert facts.
‘La storia, staccata dal documento vivo’, he explained, ‘non è più un atto spirituale, ma
una cosa, un complesso di suoni o di altri segni. Ma anche il documento, staccato dalla
vita, è nient’altro che una cosa, simile all’altra, un complesso di suoni e di altri segni’.8
Historical narrative required historical evidence, but so too did historical evidence
require historical narrative; one without the other could never result in historical truth.
Indeed, one without the other could not even be considered history, since, as Croce put
it, ‘la storia era nient’altro che quel nesso [di documento e narrazione]’.9 There is thus
no historical reality beyond human understanding, for Croce, no history that exceeds
the historian’s account. History is historical understanding, which is reality itself. In
‘Storia, cronaca e false storie’ Croce made this case succinctly, insisting that ‘bisogna
concepire il rapporto della storia con la vita come un rapporto di unità’.10 For Croce, the
entirety of life is history and history an entirely living thing. The task of the historian is
thus nothing more nor less than to explain in its essence the creation of the
contemporary world. This requires intuition, Croce insisted, the power to understand
and to re-construct the history that has produced the present moment.11 That is why,
for Croce, history is an art rather than a science, and why all history is contemporary
history.
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It is also why Croce had little time for philologists or positivists, whom he charged with
accumulating dead facts rather than encountering – and recounting – living history. The
problem with such an approach, for Croce, was that it mistook information for
comprehension, evidence for knowledge, data for truth. Even as he emphasized the
need for an empirical foundation for historiography, therefore, Croce insisted that
empiricism itself could produce neither historical understanding nor a valid historical
narrative, and he thus contrasted his own absolute historicism with the position
advanced, for instance, by Tolstoy, for whom, as Isaiah Berlin explained, history is ‘the
sum of empirically discoverable data’.12 Tolstoy had claimed, in other words, that until
all of the facts have been collected, until all experiences have been considered, history
will remain incompletely understood and the truth will remain substantially unknown.
Here is Croce’s brief against that approach.
Il Tolstoi s’era fisso in questo pensiero che, non solamente nessuno, nemmeno un Napoleone,
possa predeterminare l’andamento di una battaglia, ma che nessuno possa conoscere come
davvero essa si è svolta [… ]. Ma la battaglia è conosciuta via via che si svolge; e poi, col
tumulto di essa, si dissipa anche il tumulto di quella conoscenza, solo importando la nuova
situazione di fatto e la nuova disposizione d’animo che si è prodotta, e che si esprime nelle
poetiche leggende o si aiuta con le artificiose finzioni. E ciascuno di noi conosce ed oblia a
ogni istante i più dei suoi pensieri e atti [… ]; ma non dimentica, e serba più o meno a
lungo, quei pensieri e quei sentimenti, che rappresentano crisi memorabili e problemi
aperti pel suo avvenire [… ]. Onde è da dire che noi, a ogni istante, conosciamo tutta la
storia che c’importa conoscere; e della restante, poiché non c’importa, non possediamo le
condizioni del conoscerla, o le possederemo quando c’importerà. Quella storia ‘restante’ è
l’eterno fantasma della ‘cosa in sé’, che non è né ‘cosa’ né ‘in sé’, ma nient’altro che la
proiezione fantastica della infinità del nostro operare e del nostro conoscere.13
Croce countenanced neither Tolstoy’s doubt nor his proposed method. Whereas Tolstoy
questioned the capacity of historiography to arrive at historical understanding but held
out faith in historical fact to yield at least partial knowledge, Croce argued that
historiography could convey historical truth, but only if it expressed a creative
perception of living reality and avoided Tolstoy’s suggested method, the steady
accretion of concrete fact. Historical understanding, for Croce, was a function not of
more information but of better intuition, without which no amount of historical data
would ever cohere into a true history.
Sympathetic to Tolstoy’s arguments and unconvinced by Croce’s response, Renato Serra
responded with his own exploration of historical truth. In the 1912 letter to Croce that
Ginzburg would invoke in his debate with White, Serra declared himself ‘uno “schiavo
della cosa in sé”’, a devotee of the Tolstoyan notion of historical truth that Croce had
called into question.14 Yet Serra did not so much break with Croce, on this occasion, as
lament his inability to maintain the historical assuredness, the unwavering confidence in
the historian’s intuition, that was a bedrock principle of Crocean historicism. Serra thus
gave voice to his dissatisfaction with Croce’s theory, which struck him, in some key
respects, as inadequate for his own historical imagination.15 ‘[N]on nego che la soluzione
si possa trovare, per la strada ch’Ella mi mostra’, he explained, ‘ma io non ci arrivo, ora’.16
Serra did not seek to refute Croce, only to argue that Croce had not refuted Tolstoy.17
Likewise, he did not seek to offer a corrective to Crocean historicism, only to suggest why
and to what extent Crocean historicism required a corrective.
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Serra located the possible grounds for that corrective in his own reflections on historical
fact and historical narration, which he had developed in a 1912 essay entitled ‘Partenza di
un gruppo di soldati per la Libia’. In this evocative text, Serra considered the historical
connotations of a group of soldiers he had encountered at the train station in Cesena,
where they were awaiting their deployment in the Italo–Turkish War. He insisted that
the experiences of these soldiers – their thoughts and feelings, their fears and
motivations, their particular contributions to the cause – would inevitably be lost to
history. The war itself would thus exceed all of the narratives that might seek to record
it. ‘Nessuno può raccontare’, Serra argued. ‘Nessuno sa’. Even the soldiers themselves
would prove incapable of capturing the true nature of their experience of history.
‘Quelli che torneranno viventi, anneriti e storditi dai lunghi mesi di guerra, ne sapranno
meno di quelli che non tornano, che giacciono sotto la sabbia’, he maintained.18 To the
extent that this is true, there will remain an unbridgeable gap between any historical
episode and the historical narrative in which it is recounted. Fixated on historical
particularity, on the irreducibility of historical experience, on the historical truth that will
inevitably escape historical transcription, Serra insisted on a necessary distinction
between history and memory, between historiography and reality, between account
and event.19 As he put it:
Tutte le critiche che facciamo alla storia implicano il concetto della storia vera, della realtà
assoluta. Bisogna affrontare la questione della memoria; non in quanto è dimenticanza, ma
in quanto è memoria. Esistenza delle cose in sé. Il senso del perdere, del non poter
ricordare né dire né comprendere tutto, il senso delle cose che sfuggono alla coscienza
ferma in un punto, che si perdono, che vengono meno, che non potremo far rivivere più,
ha la sua radice in un mondo dove niente si perde: nell’eterno, che anche entrando nel
nostro tempo e diventando effimero, resta pure, in sé, eterno.20
Croce had argued that we know all of the history we need in any given historical moment;
Serra expressed real doubt about this claim, even as he admitted that he could not
disprove it.
He did not so much have an opposing historical theory as a lingering uncertainty, a
deeply felt anxiety at the thought of historical loss. Whereas Fausto Curi has identified a
‘positivismo critico’ in Serra’s essays, therefore, I am more convinced by Ezio Raimondi’s
description of Serra as a ‘positivista in crisi’.21 Serra had no more confidence in a
scientific approach to historical fact than did Croce, yet he remained fixated on the
‘cosa in sé’, the essence of historical truth, the excess that escapes historical narration –
an excess whose existence appeared not to trouble Croce, with his absolute faith in
absolute historicism.
Burdened by doubt where Croce was buoyed by confidence, Serra faced a crisis
symptomatic of the intellectual tenor of the times, when Italian intellectuals began to
express with increasing insistence their inability to share in Croce’s assured convictions.
Writing in a period dominated by Croce’s intellectual influence, a period that has been
described, with only slight exaggeration, as ‘il regno di Benedetto Croce’, Serra was
struggling against an intellectual orthodoxy.22 He was far from alone in this struggle.
What Leonardo Lattarulo said of the first fifteen years of the century, in fact, is equally
true of the entirety of what has been called ‘il cinquantennio crociano’: ‘se di egemonia
crociana si deve parlare in questa fase, va detto che essa non è mai stata pacifica e che
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invece è stata costantemente contrasta e discussa’.23 Even before Serra had sent his letter
to Croce, for example, Giovanni Papini had already articulated, in even more provocative
terms, his own dissatisfaction with Croce’s seeming inability to admit of any doubt.24 At
the same time, however, for Serra, for Papini, and for most of their contemporaries,
Croce remained the point of reference, the cultural touchstone, for virtually every
expression of the growing sense of cultural instability that was invariably (and perhaps
inevitably) advanced in Crocean terms. Italian intellectuals thus positioned themselves
dialogically, in constant conversation with Croce’s hegemonic ideology.25 Croce
effectively provided the standards and expectations against which they could formulate
their alternatives, whose connotations and implications could be perceived fully only in
opposition to the Crocean conventions. As Giuseppe Prezzolini argued about Croce’s
standing at the time, therefore, ‘[l]a guerra ha aperto una pausa per la sua popolarità,
ma non ha, si capisce, diminuito la sua grandezza’.26 Crocean thought was
indispensable even to Croce’s opponents, and as a result it retained its significance, and
its cultural centrality, even – and perhaps especially – as it fostered intellectual
resistance. That was Prezzolini’s claim in 1922, in reference to Croce’s position after the
First World War, the period of Croce’s second major decline. The same could have been
said – indeed, the same was said – some twenty years later, about Croce’s standing
after the Second World War, and his third major decline, his ‘terzo tramonto’.27
‘Uscire dal Croce per le strade da lui tracciate’: historicism after Fascism
Like their counterparts two decades earlier, Italian intellectuals after 1945 rebelled against
the hegemonic influence of Crocean aesthetics and politics, Crocean neo-idealism and
absolute historicism. Theirs was a political as well as an intellectual rebellion. Before and
throughout the war Croce had been a leading voice of anti-Fascism, emboldening
opposition to Italy’s totalitarian regime with his 1925 anti-Fascist manifesto, a document
that Francesco Flora, one of Croce’s followers and admirers, justly celebrated as ‘l’alta
protesta della cultura italiana contro le barbarie degli avventurieri’.28 While Flora’s
words of admiration suggest something of the significance of Croce’s exemplary anti-
Fascism, however, they also point towards what came to be recognized as its
limitations. For Croce’s post-war critics asserted that while he had resisted – and had
inspired others to resist – the rise of Fascism, he had done so largely by designating
culture an independent, apolitical sphere, separate from and impervious to the
incursions of social conflict. As opposition to Fascism coalesced into armed revolt, this
solution increasingly seemed too passive, too ineffectual, too compromised. Fabrizio
Onofri, one of the leaders of the anti-Fascist Resistance in Rome, thus spoke for many
after the war when he dubbed Croce’s ‘il manifesto di quello che va senz’altro chiamato
il fallimento della cultura e dell’arte, e che consiste, per dirla in una sola parola, nella
completa irresponsabilità dello scrittore e dell’artista’.29 Those who shared Onofri’s
convictions believed that it was the duty of intellectuals not to remain aloof from
politics, as Croce had argued, but instead to enter the political fray and to pursue
concrete, material change. As a result, they began to find inadequate Croce’s rejection
of Fascism, which no longer seemed to provide a sufficient model of oppositional
politics. Gaetano Salvemini put the case clearly: ‘il no di Croce rimase sempre un no
quietista; non diventò mai il no attivista di chi rischia il pane, la libertà e magari la
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vita’.30 Intellectuals now wanted something more. ‘Una volta operato il distacco dal
fascismo il liberalismo crociano non indicava una via da percorrere, delle mète da
conquistare con lotte e sacrifici’, declared the mathematician and Communist politician
Lucio Lombardo-Radice; ‘il grande vecchio non sta più davanti a noi come una mèta o
un faro’, announced the archaeologist and art historian Ranunccio Bianchi Bandinelli.31
The break with Croce thus became a kind of foundation, an inauguration for the
intellectual and political work of the post-war period.
That break was often expressed vituperatively, as critics made clear their rejection of
what was termed the ‘dittatura crociana’, the ‘dittatura dell’idealismo’, ‘assolutismo
crociano’ – loaded terms that suggest a confluence between Croce’s reign and that of
Mussolini.32 It was argued not only that Croce had failed adequately to oppose Italian
Fascism but also that he bore some responsibility for its totalitarian rule. The
philosopher Remo Cantoni was among the first to level this charge, which he defended
by insisting that Crocean idealism had indeed represented ‘una dittatura logica’,
controlling the thought of cultured Italians and inducing in them a form of quietism, of
historical resignation before the crimes of Fascism.33 In somewhat more moderate
terms, the one-time Crocean acolyte Luigi Russo made a similar point, explaining that
Croce’s
nobiltà [… ], esaltata nelle nostre vene in tutti i modi [… ], valse a trattenerci dalla dilagante
corruttela del fascismo, e ci creammo un po’ tutti, subito, proprio per merito del Croce, il ruolo
scoperto degli oppositori; ma crollato il regime fascista, già nell’estate del ‘45, chi più chi meno,
eravamo entrati in crisi. Il Croce, no; egli non si avvedeva che il crollo della dittatura di
Mussolini e di Gentile era stato il crollo anche della sua anti-dittatura [… ]. Egli insisteva
come oggi insiste nel suo orgoglio storicistico; e [… ] si ritiene chiamato a dare una
direzione spirituale a tutti gli italiani.34
Russo’s argument, like Cantoni’s, was one of the many signs of the post-war siege on the
‘Crocean citadel of historicist idealism’, which no longer appeared durable, let alone
impregnable, after Fascism.35
Faced with a historical crisis, Italian intellectuals began to find Croce’s idealist
historicism unaccountably passive, inert. It seemed not only to disregard the crisis but
even to condone it. After all, if there is an underlying order to history then historical
crises, too, have a role to play in the natural unfolding of events. Croce himself had said
as much in a 1909 essay.
Lamenteremo noi le stragi di san Bartolomeo o i roghi dell’Inquisizione o le cacciate degli ebrei
e dei moreschi o il supplizio del Servet? Lamentiamoli pure; ma serbando chiara coscienza che,
a questo modo, si fa poesia e non già storia. Quei fatti sono avvenuti e nessuno può cangiarli;
come nessuno può dire che cosa sarebbe avvenuto se non fossero avvenuti. Le espiazioni, che
la Francia e la Spagna avrebbero fatte o dovrebbero fare pei pretesi delicta maiorum, è frase di
vendicativo giudaismo, da lasciarla ai predicatori, priva di qualsiasi significato. La direi perfino
immorale, perché da quelle lotte del passato è nato questo nostro mondo presente, che
pretenderebbe ora, levarsi di fronte al suo progenitore per insultarlo o, per lo meno, fargli il
sermone.36
Croce’s choice of historical examples, more even than his quietist approach to historical
narration, must have seemed intolerable after the Second World War. The philosopher
had made himself a hostage to posterity by insisting that the present necessarily serves
as justiﬁcation for the past, and by illustrating this point with the slaughter of European
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Jews, which he suggested it would be immoral for historians to lament. It cannot have
helped matters that, once news of the Holocaust began to reach Italy, Croce appeared
to hold fast to this opinion, offering pronouncements that explicitly paralleled Jews and
Nazis as threats to European stability37 and implicitly advocated a return to ‘genteel’
anti-Semitism,38 views so repellent that critics such as Luigi Russo and Palmiro Togliatti
were led to accuse him of Jew-hatred.39 A view of history that appeared to disavow
moral judgement while countenancing such poorly judged conclusions was bound to
lose adherents after the war. The problem, as the poet and philosopher Guido Ceronetti
insisted, was that ‘lo storicismo ﬁnisce inevitabilmente col dare un crisma di validità
storica alle esperienze più tragiche e negative dell’uomo’.40 Survivors of a historical
tragedy that could not readily be redeemed, Italian intellectuals increasingly turned
away from a philosophy of history that appeared to condone a state of affairs they no
longer wished to tolerate. For those whose political and moral judgements had inspired
a rebellion against recent European history, Crocean historicism seemed to have little to
offer.
This is not to say, however, that Italian intellectuals in this period rejected historicism
tout court. Crucially, in fact, the post-war period did not give rise to an anti-historicism
so much as to a search for a new historicism. What transpired, then, was a battle pitting
‘storicismo contro storicismo’, in the words of Cesare Luporini. ‘Storicismo marxista e
rivoluzionario contro storicismo borghese e idealistico (conservatore o reazionario)’.41
On one side stood Croce and his followers; on the other, those who believed that a
more active, interventionist philosophy of history was needed to replace what the
Communist journal Rinascita dismissed as the ‘Arcadia del[lo… ] pseudo-storicismo
idealistico’.42 When the staff of Società, in the inaugural issue of that journal, demanded
an alternative to Crocean historicism, for instance, they insisted that this had to be
fashioned ‘senza rinunciare alla storia’. The aim was not anti-historicism, they explained;
it was total historicism, characterized by ‘un assoluto immanentismo’.43 In Rinascita,
Lucio Lombardo Radice made a similar case: ‘Il marxismo non è “antistoricismo”’, he
maintained.44 On the whole, the arguments mounted against Croce after the war
advocated not anti-historicism but rather what the Marxisant critic Natalino Sapegno
termed, in a 1945 essay, ‘storicismo integrale’.45 That is, they opposed Croce on the
grounds that his supposedly absolute historicism was in fact not absolute at all, that as
a result of his idealism it retained supra-historical elements.
Nevertheless, Sapegno recognized that his notion of integral historicism still bore the
signs of its origins in Croce’s idealist historicism, ‘quel metodo crociano, nel quale
anch’io, come tutti gli uomini della mia generazione in Italia, mi ero formato ed ero
cresciuto’, as he put it.46 This admission takes much of the sting out of Luigi Russo’s
biting response to Sapegno’s essay, in which he chided the critic for his manifestly
shifting intellectual allegiances.47 Sapegno had never claimed otherwise. Undergirding
Russo’s critique was a question of categorization: if Marxism is historicism, he insisted,
then historicists must be Marxists. ‘Leggendo l’articolo’, Russo thus mockingly asserted,
‘mi è avvenuto di esclamare: ahimè io ero marxista e non lo sapevo! Ahimè, anche il
Croce era marxista e anche lui non dovea saperlo’.48 In truth, however, the situation
was reversed: it was not that Croce was a Marxist but rather that Italian Marxists were
largely Crocean, at least in their intellectual formation.49 Young Italians in particular
were ‘oscillante tra Croce e Marx’, argued the Socialist politician Piero Caleffi.50 So, too,
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were Marxist intellectuals such as Elio Vittorini, once described by Alberto Asor Rosa as
‘molto più vicino a Benedetto Croce che a Marx’.51 The same was true of Italy’s
Communist leadership, since even Palmiro Togliatti, head of the Italian Communist
Party (PCI), seemed to be ‘metà Croce e metà Stalin’, in the words of Franco Fortini.52
Russo was certainly correct to identify a relationship between Italian Marxism and
Crocean historicism, therefore, but his polemical intentions led him to misjudge that
relationship’s philosophical and ideological connotations.
The truth is that Russo need not have reminded his intellectual opponents of their
debts to Croce; they readily admitted as much themselves. Despite the mounting
dissatisfaction with his theories, Croce remained a primary influence on Italian culture,
and Crocean historicism remained hegemonic for at least the next decade.53 If it was
common for post-war Italian periodicals to distance themselves from Croce during this
period, it was no less common for them to acknowledge Croce’s continuing influence.54
Of the Catholic left, for instance, Felice Balbo maintained that ‘abbiamo in Croce la
nostra sia pur lontana e mediata radice’.55 Of the Communist left, Ranuccio Bianchi
Bandinelli said that ‘ci riconosciamo debitori al Croce di tanta parte della nostra
formazione intellettuale e culturale’.56 Carlo Cassola, surveying the whole of the Italian
intellectual class, could thus declare that ‘molti scienziati, storici, filosofi si ingegnarono
a risciacquare il proprio vocabolario idealistico nel gran fiume del marxismo’.57 The
continuity of Croce’s intellectual hegemony was clear, and clearly conceded.
This state of affairs persisted even as the Italian Communist Party sought to displace
Crocean theories through the publication and dissemination of the works of Antonio
Gramsci. As the Quaderni del carcere were strategically released to the public after the
war under the careful supervision of Palmiro Togliatti, Gramsci was presented not only
as an alternative to Croce but indeed as the Anti-Croce.58 When Gramsci himself had
reflected at length on the need for an Anti-Croce, however, one modelled on Engels’s
Anti-Dühring, he had done so with a stated awareness of his own significant debts to
Crocean philosophy, and in particular to Crocean historicism.59 After all, he was part of
a generation of intellectuals who, as he put it in one of his prison letters, ‘partecipavano
in tutto o in parte al movimento di riforma morale e intellettuale promosso in Italia da
Benedetto Croce’.60 The first critical notices that Gramsci’s writings attracted after the
war often highlighted their debts to Croce. In a 1947 review in Rinascita, the flagship
journal of the Italian Communist Party, Gabriele Pepe argued that from Croce Gramsci
‘ha assimilato il più profondo spirito storicistico’, insisting, as a result, that he could best
be described as ‘un discepolo che polemizza col maestro’.61 In the same year, Paolo
Alatri wrote in the Marxist journal Società that ‘Croce e Gramsci si muovono su un
terreno comune’, while Massimo Mila argued that Gramsci’s was a ‘critica crociana in
termini crociani’.62 Gramsci himself advanced largely the same argument, making clear
that any effort to supplant Crocean hegemony would require a thorough engagement
with Crocean modes of thought, and especially with Crocean historicism. He
recommended Marxist historicism on the grounds that it could outstrip Croce on his
own terms. In Gramsci’s words, ‘lo storicismo idealistico crociano rimane ancora nella
fase teologico-speculativa’, whereas Marxist historicism, he explained, grounded in a
philosophy of praxis that drew directly on idealist precedents, represented a ‘storicismo
assoluto’, ‘realistico’, ‘un umanesimo assoluto della storia’.63 The Marxist position, then, was
presented less as the rejection than as the consummation of Croce’s historicist ambitions.
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Borrowing a phrase from Norberto Bobbio, we might surmise that, across the political
and ideological spectrum, post-war Italian culture tended ‘non già verso l’anti-Croce [… ]
ma verso l’oltre Croce’.64 Intellectuals sought not to suppress Croce but to supersede him.
Many at the time attempted to give expression to the partial, reverential, belaboured
conversion that Croce’s decline brought about in Italian culture. ‘Noi oggi dobbiamo
liberarci dal fascino che [Croce] ha esercitato per anni sull’animo nostro e, ad
esorcizzare l’incanto, dobbiamo ricantilenarci tra noi i suoi tanti difetti’, Giuseppe
Petronio argued in a 1947 essay in the journal Socialismo. ‘Eppure, appunto per
esercitare su quell’opera una critica valida, dobbiamo tener presenti la sua forza e la
qualità dei suoi mezzi’.65 It was believed, in other words, that the only way to move
beyond Croce was through a thorough immersion in Croceanism. ‘Riuscire postcrociani
senza essere anticrociani fu lo sforzo di quegli anni’, explained Gianfranco Contini.66 The
literary critic Giacomo Debenedetti outlined the situation with particular lucidity,
insisting that the only hope for a generation of intellectuals dissatisfied with but still
dependent on Croceanism had been to ‘uscire dal Croce per le strade da lui tracciate’.67
That is, as he went on to illustrate, ‘con tecnica, linguaggio e metodologia crociane ci
provavamo a forzare le uscite, che la metodologia crociana aveva sperimentate
impraticabili’.68 Debenedetti thus provided what remains the most cogent formulation
of the repeated challenges to Crocean hegemony, revealing that the apparent
rebellions in fact signalled the perpetuation of Croce’s thought, although with a
growing scepticism regarding the rules and tenets Croce himself had imposed.
‘Una storia di questa guerra sorda e sotterranea’: Debenedetti, Croce, and
Serra
Giacomo Debenedetti, the author of this epigrammatic account of Italian culture’s
dialectical overturning of Crocean hegemony, was also the author of two notable and
much-admired early accounts of the Holocaust in Italy. It is my contention that the two
efforts were intimately related, that Debenedetti’s attempt to document the assault on
the Jews of Rome was shaped by his attempt to ‘uscire dal Croce per le strade da lui
tracciate’, such that, in writing the history of the Holocaust in Italy, he was seeking to
move beyond the perceived limits of Crocean historicism. It is also my contention that
the relationship between Crocean thought and Holocaust historiography exhibited in
Debenedetti’s accounts differs meaningfully from that articulated by Carlo Ginzburg in
his debate with Hayden White. The nature of that difference merits reflection.
Debenedetti was a literary critic, not a historian or historical theorist, and I would not
wish to be mistaken for arguing that he articulated a notion of historicism to be
opposed to Croce’s. Rather, he gave expression to the growing sense of scepticism
regarding Croce’s precepts, and his doubt and uncertainty determined his approach
both to Crocean historicism and to his reporting on the Holocaust. Debenedetti’s 1922
essay ‘Sullo “stile” di Benedetto Croce’, published when the critic was just twenty-one
years old, is evidence of his early immersion in Crocean modes of thought, which
would continue for decades to exert a significant influence on his work.69 At the same
time, however, Debenedetti consistently refused the orthodoxies of Croce’s followers,
and would eventually distance himself from the teachings of Croce as well. When he
did so, he was able to explain his rationale with characteristic lucidity, stressing not only
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his own but also his generation’s need for new ideals as well as new ideas. ‘Avevamo un
maestro: il Croce’, he explained in a 1941 essay, ‘ma volgevano appunto gli anni, in cui
bene o male si tentava di allargare il campo da lui aperto’.70 Expanding on this point in
his 1949 ‘Probabile autobiografia di una generazione’, Debenedetti maintained:
L’età di cui il Croce, grande epigono, esprime l’uomo medio con la lucidità, la coerenza, il
fascino del genio, fu un’età sostanzialmente non tragica. I chierici, i legislatori e le altre
guide potevano credere in buona fede che gli eroi del secolo avessero trafitto con la spada
i pescecani o i draghi della terra e del mare, e che, perfusi di quel sangue, avessero
appreso il linguaggio degli alati sugli alti rami; cioè più o meno la risoluzione della Storia
nell’Idea. A noi è toccato di nascere dopo [… ].71
This passage highlights a signiﬁcant point of conﬂict: Croce continued to project a
historical conﬁdence that had been dashed, in the younger generations, by Fascism and
the Second World War. What distanced Debenedetti and his contemporaries from
Crocean historicism, I mean to say, was their experience of history.
Debenedetti’s post-Crocean approach to the tragic history of the twentieth century is
most evident in his ‘16 ottobre 1943’. This path-breaking account of the Nazi roundup
of the Roman Jews, often acknowledged as the first prominent treatment of the subject
in the Italian press, was published in the journal Mercurio in December 1944, in an issue
devoted to memorializing, in medias res, the war and the Resistance in Italy. Tellingly,
even as the journal’s editors undertook to achieve this ambitious goal they called into
question the very possibility of writing the history of the war. ‘Difficile sarebbe [… ] fare
oggi una storia di questa guerra sorda e sotterranea’, they argued in the introduction.72
The difficulty stemmed from an apparent mismatch between the nature of recent
historical experience and the norms of historical narrative:
in quest’anno speciale – che ha avuto inizio per tutta l’Italia l’8 settembre e che per ogni
regione o città si chiude col giorno della propria liberazione – possiamo dire di aver speso
molto di noi. Il conto non può farsi oggi e del resto un certo pudore vieterebbe di farlo.
Anche perché la partita singola prende corpo e valore solo se associata a quella degli
altri. E gli altri, in questo caso, sono molti, e sconosciuti, e distanti. È il totale che conta, e
non la cifra particolare. Ma la storia, invece, è fatta di particolari, dell’apporto minimo che
ciascuno ha recato, del granello di fede, di speranza, di rischio, di tenacia che ciascuno ha
bruciato.73
The editors’ reticence suggests the emerging conﬂict between the conﬁdence of Crocean
historicism and the doubt introduced by the war, between the historian’s supposed grasp
of the totality of history and the witness’s partial understanding of his or her particular
experience. What they were attempting with this issue of Mercurio, we might say, was
to undertake a Tolstoyan accretion of historical fact without yet abandoning their
Crocean conception of historical narrative. This made the writing of history difﬁcult, as
they put it, if not impossible.
It was believed Giacomo Debenedetti had overcome this difficulty, however, and his
eyewitness account was singled out by his contemporaries as a model for post-war
historical narrative. As one critic put it in a 1945 essay in the journal Società, ‘la difficoltà
in cui si è trovato Debenedetti (ma che [… ] sarà l’eterna difficoltà di chi si mette per
questa strada), fu nel rispettare i fatti e insieme nell’inquadrarli [… ] in un determinato
THE ITALIANIST 397
spazio-tempo che dia loro vita’.74 Debenedetti thus appeared to have achieved the
primary objective of historical writing in a moment of historical uncertainty.
Oggi vogliamo indugiare più a lungo sulle cose prima di generalizzarle in uno schema
qualsiasi, veder chiaro nell’animo degli uomini, conoscere bontà e malvagità prima di
credere all’efficacia miracolistica di un’idea qualunque sulla loro natura. [… ] Per questo è
indispensabile meditare sui fatti senza cercar di forzare il giudizio di nessuno. Ciascuno poi
sarà portato a giudicare da sé.75
History no longer appeared to follow an established direction or to conform to any
overarching idea, but that need not mean that historians had to present facts arbitrarily
or unthinkingly, foreclosing on the very possibility of historical judgement. Debenedetti
was commended for his judgement, and for having brought the facts of his account to
life in such a way that the reader could grasp their historical signiﬁcance and arrive at a
critical verdict even before a complete understanding had been reached or a deﬁnitive
narrative had been ﬁxed.
Underlying this achievement was Debenedetti’s recognition of his limitations, his
admission of doubt, scepticism, and uncertainty. When the special issue of Mercurio
went to press, the war was still ongoing, and information, let alone understanding, was
scarce. Debenedetti, a Roman Jew, had managed to escape to Cortona in flight from
Nazi persecution, but because of a chance return to the Italian capital he was present
on the morning of 16 October 1943, although safely ensconced in a position that
allowed him to witness, to investigate, and to record for posterity the tragedy of the
city’s Jewish population.76 Nevertheless, this task was far from straightforward, and
Debenedetti’s essay is replete with historical confusion. Frequently, that confusion
emerges through the narrator’s repeated attempts to ventriloquize the confusion of his
subjects: ‘Che faranno di noi?’, he imagines them asking. ‘Che vogliono? con chi ce
l’hanno? dove vanno?’77 More common still are the author’s expressions of his own
confusion: ‘Come giunsero i loro nomi alle SS?’ ‘Ma avrebbero poi dato retta a
quell’allarme?’78 These compounding doubts inspire a certain resignation before the
unknowability of history. That unknowability proves to be the central point, the fulcrum,
of Debenedetti’s narrative. He seems to have set out to document the gap between the
reality of historical events and the possibility of historical understanding. The strategy of
the Nazis and the fate of the Roman Jews, he suggested, were inherently, inescapably,
enigmatic. ‘Torto nostro a voler cercare una regola nel più spaventoso degli arbitri’.79
Even as Debenedetti accepted the moral imperative to record this historical event, he
recognized that historical reality would necessarily exceed historical comprehension and
could never fully be captured in the historical record.
Debenedetti’s approach has thus been termed, rather unconvincingly, ‘radicalmente
antistoricista’.80 Risa Sodi is closer to the mark when she finds in ‘16 ottobre 1943’ early
traces of microhistory, the field of historical investigation pioneered by Carlo
Ginzburg.81 As far as I am aware, Ginzburg himself has not identified Debenedetti as an
intellectual inspiration. Yet in explaining his own historical methodology, Ginzburg
nevertheless suggests several intriguing points of contact. Most significant of all is his
insistence on what he has called ‘l’idea, tutta novecentesca, che ho posto al centro della
microstoria: e cioè che gli ostacoli frapposti alla ricerca sotto forma di lacune e
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distorsioni della documentazione devono diventare parte del racconto’.82 On this point,
like Croce, Ginzburg takes his distance from Tolstoy, who
supera d’un balzo lo scarto inevitabile fra le tracce frammentarie e distorte di un evento (una
battaglia, per esempio) e l’evento stesso. Ma questo balzo, questo rapporto diretto con la
realtà può verificarsi solo (anche se non necessariamente) sul terreno dell’invenzione: allo
storico, che dispone solo di tracce, di documenti, esso è per definizione precluso.83
Even as he focuses on the accretion of facts, the novelist, unlike the microhistorian, refuses
to abandon the ambition to construct a totalizing narrative. Rather than Tolstoy, Ginzburg
thus goes on to explain, the precursor for his notion of microhistory was Renato Serra, and
in particular Serra’s ‘Partenza di un gruppo di soldati per la Libia’, which ‘riprende le
riﬂessioni di Tolstoj (senza nominarlo) ma le sviluppa in una direzione completamente
diversa’.84 In Serra’s insistence on the necessary gap between historical fact and
historical narrative Ginzburg found license for a mode of historical investigation that
looked to the discrete, the particular, and even the personal in search of the truth of
historical reality.
‘16 ottobre 1943’ offers the tantalizing suggestion that Giacomo Debenedetti had taken
from Serra’s essay a related lesson while arriving at a rather different conclusion. As is well
known, Serra was an ‘autore di culto per Debenedetti’, and one Debenedetti read, on a
number of occasions, against Benedetto Croce in a manner not unlike that which
inspired Ginzburg’s notion of microhistory.85 Tellingly, Walter Pedullà both baptized
Debenedetti ‘l’eretico del crocianesimo’ and recounted the critic’s expressed ambition
to be Serra (‘Essere Serra’).86 Moreover, examining Debenedetti’s ‘Probabile
autobiografia di una generazione’ – the text in which he had expressed the need to
‘uscire dal Croce per le strade da lui tracciate’ – Pedullà compared the critic’s preferred
methodology to ‘microfisica’, while Romano Luperini considered it ‘microfilologico’.87 I
do not believe Debenedetti ever employed such terms to describe his critical approach,
but he did credit Renato Serra with inspiring his decision to become a literary critic.88
Did Serra also inspire ‘16 ottobre 1943’?89 One cannot and therefore should not say
with certainty.
What is evident, however, is that, in compiling his account, Debenedetti, like Serra,
lacked Croce’s faith regarding the historian’s possession of all of the necessary historical
knowledge. Recognizing the inevitable absence of accurate documentation, he refused
to offer any totalizing narration. In fact, he refused even to present himself as a
historian. ‘Io sono un critico, questo è il mio unico mestiere letterario’, he wrote at the
outset of his account. ‘Il 16 ottobre è stato scritto da chi l’ha vissuto direttamente’.90
Like Serra, therefore, whose concern was for the voices of the soldiers that would go
unheard, Debenedetti pursued an account that could speak for those whose experience
of history otherwise risked being silenced. The testimony he claimed to offer was not
his own, then, but rather that of the community of Roman Jews targeted for
extermination. In speaking on their behalf, moreover, Debenedetti acknowledged his
own feelings of doubt and inadequacy, his conviction that there would inevitably
remain an excess of reality, what Serra had called the ‘cosa in sé’, beyond the historical
record.
Debenedetti’s truth claims thus rested substantially – and polemically – on a series of
selective departures from a set of cultural standards established by the diffusion of
THE ITALIANIST 399
Crocean historicism. Croce had postulated that ‘la battaglia è conosciuta via via che si
svolge’.91 Debenedetti underlined what he did not know, what could not be known.
Croce had said that ‘noi, a ogni istante, conosciamo tutta la storia che c’importa
conoscere’.92 Debenedetti drew attention to what he wanted to understand but could
not, what he needed to know and would not. This was a gesture of humility, but in the
context of his historical account it constituted a bold claim to authority. Operating
against a backdrop of Crocean historicism, with its confident faith in historical intuition,
historical narrative, and historical truth, Debenedetti staked the validity of his history on
an alternative standard of historical knowledge. Precisely by emphasizing what he could
not know and would not say, Debenedetti was affirming the value of what he could
know and had to say. Truth itself was thus made a function of his account’s divergence
from cultural conventions that Debenedetti no longer wished to adopt.
Conclusion
In a recent re-assessment of the ‘Probing the Limits of Representation’ conference, Wulf
Kansteiner and Todd Presner advanced the case that
[Hayden] White’s interest in the neo-idealist philosophies of history of Benedetto Croce and
Giovanni Gentile doesn’t scandalize us today – as it did Ginzburg and many other readers
of that exchange – for it simply recognized the modernist tenor of their philosophies of
history.93
I do not believe Kansteiner and Presner effectively describe Ginzburg’s uneasiness with
White’s position, which was a function less of the ‘scandal’ of Crocean idealism than of
the limits of Crocean historicism. For Ginzburg, those limits are a function of Croce’s
lofty disregard for the ‘cosa in sé’, for the existence of a historical reality behind the
available historical evidence and beyond the comprehension of the conﬁdent historian.
Ginzburg thus invoked Renato Serra, in whose name he re-afﬁrmed the reality of
history, the ‘cosa in sé’, in order to counteract what he saw as Hayden White’s Croce-
inspired ‘skepticism and relativism’ and to re-afﬁrm the Holocaust’s undeniable facticity,
a historical truth he located outside the conventions of historical narrative.
Giacomo Debenedetti posited his truth against the conventions of narrative history.
While not dissimilar, these two approaches nonetheless differ significantly. Inspired by
his lingering doubts regarding what he called Croce’s ‘risoluzione della Storia nell’Idea’,
Debenedetti struggled to envision an alternative while readily acknowledging his
continuing reliance on Crocean historicism. In this, he followed in a long line of Crocean
apostates, spreading back to the turn of the twentieth century, who responded to
various historical crises – the Italo–Turkish War, the First World War, and the Second
World War – by expressing scepticism regarding Croce’s self-assured historical faith. This
scepticism rarely resulted in outright rejection, tending instead to inspire attempts, as
Debenedetti put it, to ‘uscire dal Croce per le strade da lui tracciate’. Croce thus
managed to sustain a lasting cultural hegemony despite the substantial doubt his
arguments inspired. I have sought to argue that Debenedetti, compelled to work
simultaneously within and against that hegemony, foregrounded his doubts in order
selectively to depart from the expectations Croceanism had engendered. It was by
means of those selective departures, in the form of his acknowledgments of his own
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limits as a historian, the limits of the available historical evidence, and the limits of Crocean
historicism, that Debenedetti sought to establish the veracity of his representation of history.
Reality exists, Debenedetti might well have been saying, as Ginzburg would say more than
four decades later. But reality exists, for Debenedetti, not as a fact to be discovered beyond
the conventions of narrative history, as Ginzburg would argue, but instead as a truth to be
articulated through critical engagement with those conventions. For those who adopt this
approach, the search for historical reality and the writing of historical narrative will
necessarily entail probing the limits of representation.
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